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INTRODUCTION:
Teledyne 8rown Engineering (TBE) was tasked by several _JASAOrganizations to
organize, conduct and document a workship devoted to Space Station internal
contamination issues. These organizations included the Office of Space Station
(Code S), the Office of Space Science ano Ai:plications (Code E), and Office of
Aeronautics and Space Technology (Code R). Representatives from NASA, NASDA,
ESA,SpaceStation contractors and the private sector were invited to attend.
Approximately 200 individuals attended, representing a broad _pectrum of
industries and organizations.
"he official program was divided into several sessions which addressed the
following topics:
1. Past Flight Experience (Skylab and Spacelab missions)
2. Present Flight Activities (Spacelabs and Soviet Space Station IVlir)
3. Future Activites (Materials Science and Life Scienc_ Experiments)
4. Space Station Capabilities (PMMS, FMS, ECLSS,and US Laboratory Overview)
5. Mcnned Systems/Crew Safety
6. Internal Contamination Detection
7. Contamination Control - Stowage and Handling
8. Contamination Control - Waste Gas Processing
In order to document and summarize the findings of this workshop, TBE appointed
a panel consisting of the following members: Dr. Bonnie J. Dunbar (NASA/JSC), Dr.
Martin Coleman (NASA/JSC), and Mr. Kenneth Mitchell (NASA/MSFC). The panel
facilitated discussion during the sessionsand summarized these discussions and
resulting recommendations at the completion of each days activites.
This report is a compilation of issues,concerns, and other topics which arose during
the workshop. It isdivided into three sections. In the first section, Space Station
design assumptions are discussed. The second section discusses issuesand concerns
as they relate to (I) policy and n_anagemenL (2) subsystem design, (3) experiment
design, and (4) internal contamina_¢,,_ detecl ion andcontrol. The last section ,I
summarizes the recommendations generate_ durinc_ the three day workshop. Most ,
of the concerns and recommendations .cu.r",marized in this report were not the result
of single sessions, but appeared as recurring themes during the workshop. !
The panel believes that the workshop was very worthwhile and that serious
decisions must now be n'._de. We believe that, in order to avoid costly redesign in
the future, the issues and concerns identified in this report should be receiving
' maximum attention by the Space Station Project in its early engineering ,
development of subsystems and experiment facilities. !
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!SPACE STATION DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS:
Space Station Freedom design is currently comprised of one habitability modul_, and ,
of three laboratory modules; one each from the United States (USL), Japan (JEM),
and the European Space Agency (Columbus). All four of the modules are
interconnected by nodes. The experiments which will involve the bulk of the
hazardous materials to be handled represent two disciplines: life sciences and
; materials sciences. While both of the disciplines have flown on prior Skylab and
Space Shuttle missions, the Space Station will include many new in $itu =ample
_ preparataons. For the mat_.rials sciences,this includes a family of liquid etching
acids for which we have no prior space flight experience. In the field of life sciences,
although we have previously "fixed" samples on orbit, both animal dissection and
cell cultures will introduce new experiment materials and operations to the Space
Sta;ion.
i There ar_ several fundamental design and operations concepts which are applied to
terrestrial laboratories and which can be considered relevant to a space-based
facility. They are the following: (!) the Space Station Freedom is _1 international
laboratory which should be governed by well und_tood and consistent safety
policy/guidelines, (2) facility design isthe first line of protection against t azardous
situations but operations ot the design must also be well understood, (3) if the
-_ facility design/operations fail, then appropriate detection should be in place to
annunciate the hazard to the crew, (4) there must be preplanned on -orbit
methods to recover and handle wastes, in,duding accidental in-cabin spills, _)
procedures and hardware must be _resent to medically treat crewmembers, and (6)
the wastes must be transported safely to the ground for further disposal.
The handling of toxic and reactive materials aboard the Space Station will be
particularly challenging for the following reasons: (1) The Statmn is nearly a closed
environment-- rapid evacuation is not possible, (2) the I_boratory researchers must
habitate a volume intimately connected to their laboratory, and (3) m=_terials
science and life science experiments wil be conduced ,n the sar,le laboratory; this
does not occur in ground based ;aboratories.
There are presently three Station subsystems being designed which are involved in
the detection and/or control of toxic and reactive materials: the Environmental
Control 3nd Life Support System (ECLSS), the ProcessMaterials Management
Subsys*em (PMMS), and the Fluid Management System (FMS). .:,
The primary U.S Lab sub._ystem being designed t_ ateract with hazardous/toxic _nJ
reactive materials isthe PMMS. It consistsof the following elements.
- ProcessFluids Storage and Distribution
- Chemical Storage
- Materials Transport
- Ultrapure Water Management
-Waste Materials Handling
- Leak Detection
," - Crew/hardware decontamination
- Vacuum Venting (high quality source and waste gas vent) L1
The Spac_ Station ECLSSprovides trace contaminant gas removal frnm the crew's
breathable atmosphere aswell as :';.'onitoring of atmospheric contamman,; (gases
and particulates). These trace gas_.sare primarily generated from metabolic
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processesof the crewandelectronicsequipmentoff-gassing.ThePMMSand/orthe
payload will provide containment and control fo, their non-standar_ substanc_s--
not the ECLSS.
TheFMSinteractswith the P_IMSinthe vacuum,--ent;ngof wa_e gasesand the
resupply of fluids (water, mitrogen) to the U.S. Lab. The =liowabie v_aste gas
constituent.e, are being defined to the work pack,_ges and the Intern=tionai partners
through a Level II FMSworkir, g group.
!
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FINDINGS AND CONCERNS
POUCYAND ORGANIZATION
1. THENEEDFORA SAFETYATTITUDE
t
Although enginering solutions are being designed to handle toxic and reactive
materialson a routine basis,we found alack of emphasison bcjth operations and
the exploration of accidentscenarios.Clearly, the designers must prepare for the
worst in addition to designing to prevent it. Specifically,more emphasisneeds to be
placed upon approachesto "in cabin spills"resulting in the cleanup of hazardous or
. toxic materials,and the isolationof contc ._ninatedmodules,. Thiswas well
reinforced by severalof the private sectorpresentersat the w¢rkshop. Additionally,
the responsiblitytor these activities should be assignedto an organization. There
]t_ appeared to be no one who believed that to be in their charter . _he safetYr;'foattitude isge_ane to any research program, it isa day to day responsibiity
everyone involved.
i- 2. THENEEDFORA UNIFORM SAFETYPOLICY
Thisworkshop wasorganized for all SpaceStation participants. However, ESAsen_ i '
•_ one representative who was not,a professionalsafety employee and NASDAsent
two representatives,but their safety policywas not voiced. Fromthe discussions I
which occurred,we crmcludedthat the Safety Policieswhich we believe are !n effect !
_. for SpaceShuttle anr_which clrebeing developed for SpaceStation are not be;ng
: communicated to our i_ternational partners. Asa matter of information, the ESA
inform_.<lrepresentative the gro_p that ESAassumed that NASAwould dictate
• safety requiremen'csto them, and had not yet taken a formal look at safety in the :
Columbusmodul_:d_velopment. Implementation of safety policiesin the US ,.
module alone will not prot.ecta crew from catastrop.%;cevents.
The Station must_e:viewed asone resource oper_Jtingunder one standard of
Safety, for both eKgerimentsand subsystemdevelopment. Reference sho_Jh:lbe
madr to the NRC_ries on "Prudent Practic_ for Handling HazardousCh_:r..cals in
Labr_ratories".A(_ditionally,the cjuestionof who isvestedwith final resr_c)nsibility
for safety o_the !;tation's internal environment should be clarified
3. THENEEDFORA MATURESAFETYORGANI7:AT!ON
Dur:r_gthe workshop, both SpaceStation subsystemdesi_lner'_(r_CLSS,FMS, PMMS), '
: and experiment developersstated that their hardware c_esi_nswere dependent
ui_on clearly articulated safety requirements. Withou_ sp_c,ficdesign requirements
and accessto past flight experience_, hardware is subier'cto later redesign, r
However,the SpaceStation Safer/organization isstil_being dev,.Ioped and not in
the positionof advisingeither system _esignersor experiment developers
,_ (particularly material processingfurnaces)on suchitems asfault tolerance, triple
containment, etc.
Although the JSCSafety Boardshave addressedmany of these,_me questic)nswith
respectto the SpaceShuttle/Spacelab subsysterasand payload;, most of these
designersdo not have accessto th._seboards. _nmany cases,the designers, by not
: being familiar with past flight experiencesu_ing similar designs,were re-inventing
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the wheel'. Forexample, the PMMS and FMS are at a point wh,n seriousdesign
decisionsmust be made (these are discussedlater). The early involvement uf flight
safeR personnelwith facility des!gners/experimenters should resolvemany issues,
avoiding sermusreaeslgn OTequlr_ment.
One suggestedsolution isto utilize the safety organization at NASA/JSCfor a_ :,
interim period of time, sothat "dmelyresponseisavailable to the hardware
_ designers. However, with ,theadvent of the SpaceStation Safety boards, cor tinuity ._*
, should be maintained. The utilization of different NASAsafety organizat!on_ should
'_ be virtuallytransparent to a userof either Shuttle or SpaceStation. Many p_yl,)adswill fly on Forexample, the furnaceswhich
anbOth, are.being developed _y ES_,_rJASDA, many USusers for SpaceStation will ,y Tirs'¢on St=acelabfhghts.
Another suggestion isto combine these NASAsafety orqanizatio,"_s,_.herebv
reduc!ngthe number of safety interlaces for a user,and-r' _ovid,ngconsisten_j and a
pastnight experience data base to the evaluation of su_/,_/ste_designs. Consistent
__ safety policy isimportant for all spaceflight elements.
_ Memoers of the workshop suggested th _t until mr,re accessto the Safety\_ Organization isavailable, the SpaceStab,onproo:arn _hould provide safety related
._ design requirements in a "UsersMan,,al'. Thi_ m;_ual should provide hardware
design options and clearlydefine suc.rconce_tsas'two fault t.'Jlerance,triple
i containment and hazard control". Fu,rnace designers wish to understand the
_ concept of "credible failure" and how procedures, function;_lfeatures (e.g door
interlocks,etc) and negative pres_r,: or,erations contribute to their design.
_ Communication of pastand present fl',ghtexperience related to safety and facility
_esigns isessential. Designersshr.luJjalso have accessto Sr_acelabHazard Analyses
_ and SafetyCompliance Data. Fo_many users,the nee(] for this documentation is
_ now.
Unless the development of the Safety organization can be expedited, both the
" _t._tion schedule and cost at,: at risk.
4. THENEEDFORBETTERCOMMUNICATIONS
Better communicationsare required a_rossthe board: Between the international r
partners, between the.,NASACenters, between the contractors and NASA, between
NASAand t',dustry, _nd between all elements and the flight operations
organizations. The Office of SpaceFlight (Code M) was not an official organizer of
thisworkshop bu_.isresponsiblefor flight crew training and safety. Future
discussionsregarding operational experiencesand approaches to on-board safety
n,,aybe directe_Jto the Flight Crew Operations u_ice (FCOO)at NASA/JSC.
FCODhasseveral in_.._rnalAstronaut organizations expresslyestablishedto develop
an earlyworking relationship with flight hardware designers: the Shuttle Mission
. Development Group, the SpaceStatio_ Group, and the ScienceSupport Group.
Communicationsmust be open, frequer,_, and alongmo clearlydefined paths
among Centers and other organizations. Our _ast flight re
_ experience with STS-51L
, ,andthe emphasisthat the RogersCommissionpl_ced-on communic&tions _:ust not
De _essonslearned" which are lost. Thls workshop was believed by all participants
to be an important first step in that direction.
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5. COMMONALITY
The question of commonality, which hasarisen in other systemdesigns affecting the
international modules, iseven more important in the arena of safely handling toxic
and reactive materials. There isnot a common design approach for the handling of
these materials and it isnot apparent that the international partners are actively
, _ addressingthe potentional problems. Again, the agencyisfaced with defining
• safety design criteria and then implementing theseas requirements. An important
question ishow NASAwill taskthese requirements to the partners and oversee their
implementation. The SpaceStation crewsmust not be trained to safe three
different systemdesigns. The lack of commonality between safety systemsisa well
known contributer to industrial and aircraft accidents.
STATIONSUBSYSTEMDESIGN
6. UTILIZATIONOFGROUND BASEDLABORATORYSAFETYFEATURES
Proceduresand d_,tagenerated by ground based laborabories isan excellent
resourcedata base for understanding and implementing procedures/hardware for
the safe handling of toxicand reactivechemicals. NASAshould not re-invent the
wheel. One representative from the semiconductorindustry stated that we were
about _years behind industry in our approach to the problem. At the sametime,
I le_
,,j,:rsstated that new safe handhng procedures which NASA may develop for this
. more restrictiveenvironment may have commercialapplications on the cjround.
More interaction with both industryand commercial laboratories should be
pursued.
7. NUMBEROF ECLSSSTATIONSFORMONITORING TRACEGASES
" i !
The total number of ECLSSIocatiorls for monitoring trace gase.cin the cabin i
atmosphere needsto be evaluate_' with respectto the entire monitoring systemsin I ;
the USL,JEM,and Columbus. Cub'r_'ntly7 locationsare baselined in the Space _ !
station configuration with the inten,.ational modules attached. Thismay not be
enough, part=cularly if early "leak wan'.ing" needsto be annunciated to the crew. i
The PMMS plansto detect at the rack level, but it isnot clear if these will be _
experiment specificor general detectors.
8. PMMS DESIGNLIMITATIONS
Asdesigned, the PMMS proposesto collect a variety of both life scienceand
materials sciencewastes. In this respect, it hasa much broader __¢opethan any
existingground basedlaboratory or industry. However, it haslimited the typesof
waste it will handle. The limitations to experiment development are not clear.
Experimentdesigners need this information in order to procede. Questions
remaining include which wastesare regenerable (besidesthe water recovery
feature) and what waste storage systemswill PMMS provide for returning
hazardouswaste to earth via the logisticselements.
The current PMMS baseline design hasa centralized waste material approach.
Tradesare to be performed on alternate approaches: decentralized storage of ',
1-7 .
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waste by PMMS versus user provided waste storage at the rack level. Current
Shuttle/Spacelab operations do not use a common waste collection system.
Chemicals (e.g. varieties of acids) used in the etching of metrology specime'_s might
be better handled within the glovebox and stored in a separate container for
transport back to the ground. The mixing of acids, cell cultures, fixatives, and etc
presents an infinite matrix of design requirements for a disposal system. Since
Space Station facilities are being designed now, there isa definite need to identify
their interfaces and requirements for waste disposal. As an added note, neither the
JEM or Columbus have an interface with the PMMS, which may result in at least
three methods for storing and transporting experiment wastes. Experiments which
may design their interfaces for the US lab may find that although they have access
to the ESAor Japanese labs, their experiment interfaces are incompatible.
i Finally, NASA should review certain design features of the PMMS using past
experience with liquid transport systems(e.g. Shuttle/Spacelab and Skylab). For
example, it is not clear how the wastes from a glovebox operated experiment are
actually introduced to the PMMS water lines in a micro-cl environment; how
residue left in containers are handled" how wastes whic_t may have deposited on
the interior of the large volume gloveboxes are collected for disposal, and how the
task for predicting multi-chemical reactions in a "holding tank'will be
accomplished, particularly if the chemicals used in metrology or cell fixation today
may not be the same ones we use in 10 years.
9. ISOLATION OF THE ECLSSAVIONICS AIR COOLING LOOP
The isolation of the avionics air loop from the equipment containing toxic chemicals
could be a design issue. More investigation of the user requirments for cooling and
the hazards associated with the equipment requiring cooling must occur.
|0. HUMAN FACTORS ARE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN SAFETY DESIGN
Facilities should consider the mainenance and re_aif capabilities of the crew on
orbit, particularly if a system iscritical to continued safe functioning of the station.
_ Hazard detection and adequate alerts to the crew are essential. As illustrated by
both the Skylab and Shuttle crewmembers, alerts should identify both the location
of the hazard aswell as the type.
11. CONTINGENCY PLANNING IS ESSENTIAL
Contingency planning should be an essential element of hardware design.
Unexpected events should be expected and planned for. It was recommended that
procedures and hardware be developed for in cabin spills (for both subsystem and
experiment ,ailure) and that hazardous payloads be manifested far from exits.
, Participants felt that Iocatingthe emergency shower or an alternate
• decontamib_ation system in the node would provide better isolation of a crewman
from a spill and allow more ready accessfrom the ESA _=ndJEM modules.t
I 12. DESIGN OF A CREWMEMBER DECONTAMINATION SYSTEM
Ground based laboratories usually utilize emergency showers and eye wash systems
to rapidly remove contaminating materials from the body. Space Station has
: located a hygiene shower in the U.S. Laboratory which will also be used as an
emergency shower. Several aspects of this approach must be evaluated: (1) will a
shower work as effectively in a zero G environment as it does in one G? (2) what are
1"8
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the ramifications of detoxifying a crew member in the module which must be
isolated? (3) will crewmembers working in other modules having no _imilar system ',
be able to use the system and won t crosscontamination become a problem? and (4)
what other neutralizing systems and treatment are also readily accessible?
Ground based showers use a deluge system and rely on a large volume of water to
dilute contaminants on the body and deliver them away from the body. In zero G,
such a shower would require immediate storage accessand a large vacuum to pull
water from the body and surrounding shower surfaces.
13. SPACESTATION SMAC VALUES MUST BE EXPEDITED
The spacecraft maximum allowable concern:ration (SMAC) levels for trace
contaminants in the cabin atmosphere have not been defined for space station.
Current designs use shuttle data for a 10 day mission. NRC is under contract to JSCto
develop design criteria. The ECLSSand the PMMS need this data as soon as possible
in order.to design control and monitoring systems.
14. DESIGN VERIFICATION ABOARD THE SHUTTLE
Many of the new fluid handling systems represent new technologies and will
receive their first flight test once installed on the Space Station. Consideration
;hould be given to flight verification of some of these newer systems prior to
im,_lemention on the station. ESA is currently using Spacelab flights for Columbus
subs;,stem and experiment development. Flight test should ideally occur in 1990 to
support development schedules (CDR) but the lack of accessto the manifest and the
estimated costs ($44M/flight for ECLSS)are presently formidable barriers.
15. DE._',JNING AIR FLOWS FOR SAFER OPERATIONS
In microgravity, it may be beneficial to consider designing air flows to give
directionality to the movement of fluids in the Space Statior modules. In ground
based facilities gravity is relied upon to pull hazardous and toxic chemicals down
away from the faces of experimenters. On th_ Space Station, crPative solutions may
be required to perform a similar function. The greatest personn ' hazards are from
eye contact, in_&lation, and ingestion. _.
16. DECEN ,RALIZATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE i
Dec_,_tralization rather than centralized handling of waste again b,_came a theme _,
r_ the "Industry approach °. Control the hazard as quicki_ as possible and isolate it
from other locations in the system. This applies even to the laboratory module
level. Industries' laboratores are isolated totally from the rest of the facilities. The i
Space station EC_.SSintegrates the module atmospheres for control o_ the total
pressure, oxyg,an pratial pressure, C02 removal, trace gas contaminant monitoring
and co,_tr¢l, and some humidity control. If an emergency occurs within a module,
there is the capability to isoate it from the rest of the staion configuration but this _-
occur'. ,=fter the fact. Normally, in the interest of safety and crew rescue, hatches to
:he experiment modules should remain open during experiment operations and
only closed in the event of an emergency.
!
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EXPERIMENT DESIGN
17. IS VACUUM VENTING ALLOWED ?
Many of the experiments in high temperature materials science require an external
vent line for two reasons: (1) to rough pump a vacuum on the experiment and (2) to
expell inert gases ',e.g. He and At) which have been used during the experiment
process. Although vacuum venting has been used on previous 5pacelab flights,
there was consiaerable disagreement regarding its allowance on Space Station.
Arguments largely related to the degree of contamination to the external
environment. Additionally, although the US usersare actively debating this
question, it appears that ESA will continue in the Spacelab mode. Therefcre, the
present station design calls for a USlab which will not allo_ users to vent inert gases
overboard, therefore constraining or eliminating many experiments, while the
Columbus will allow it. Resolution of this question must occur as soon as possible.
Systems design can not proceed without a decision, and analyses will be required in
any case.
18. THE NEED FOR AN EXPERIMENT DESIGN DATA BASE
Asstated earlier there is much confusion among new experiment/facility
developo, rs concerning levels of containment, hazards, fault tolerance, etc. There is
an early need to establish a data base of criteria and acceptable designs which have
previously flown. Many new furnace designers are again re-inventing the wheel
and not benefitting from the data generated during Shuttle and Spacelab flights.
19. AVAILABLE CREW TIME FOR EXPERIMENTS
There isstill considerable discussion regarding crew availability to perform
experiments, experiment reconfiguration, and repair. While crew time may be a
favor in equipment design, the science objectives shouldn't be comprom,sed in
orcler to achieve total autonomy. Whether or not an experiment requires extensive
crew time depends somewhat on itsdiscipline (e.g. life science experiments may
require much crew time) and its objectives. Designers should try to optimize both .;
automation and crew interaction. Where treys:operation is required to achieve iscience bjectives, then this should be articuial and coordinated early in the
design process. In many cases,automation is lessflexible, more costly, and more
complicated than use of the crew. Automation lends itself to routine and repetitive
tasks and should be used accordingly. Astronauts at NASAJJSChave established a
Science Support Group to work with scientists and engineers early in the design
process.
i
20. GLOVEBOX DESIGN AND USERREQUIREMENTS !
l
The Glovebox briefings revealed the need for more user involvment to define user ]
requirements. It wasn't clear whether the potential users of the glovebc x (who i
must interface their experiments with it) were at the workshop. Users must spend
more time with the designers and representatives of the astronaut office discussing i
experiment operation and requirements. Unless this occurs, equipment such as the
I-I0 1
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lovebox, the PMMS, and the general lab support equipment will not be properly
eveloped. More meetings between real lab users and the hardware designers
must occur.
INTERNALCONTAMINATION DETECTIONAND CONTROL
J
19. EXPLOREINSTRUMENTATIONTECHNOLOGYMORE THOROUGHLY
Presentationson internal contamination and control showed exciting ap,)licat_,_s
to spacestation problems. In particular, the government's military proe,rar,ls or_
chemicaland biological warfare hasproduced instrumentation and rem,)'/al d( vices
_hateha;eat:'_.nifNi_tlyem_r_oC:Px_,_'rietYt_;an_vYe_fph_r,r__:_r_ibeinghether
they are first generation systemsfor the spacestation or secondgt.neration,
evolutsonary systemsthat we could place on the st=tion within it,,30 year life. The
specificitemsare the MS/MStechnology pre.;ented by Dr. Marsh and the reactive
bed plasmasystemfor contamination control pre,;ented by Mr. Joe Birmingham.
The particulate detection technology preset:ted h,yMr. Robert Caldow appeared to
have SpaceStation applicationsaswell.
i-ii
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RECOMMENDATIONS
" POUCY ANOORGANIZATION
1. Establish clear and uniform Safety Policies for all modules: JEM, Columbus and
USL. Approaches to safety policy impl,,mentation should be similar to thOSe used
for ground based nat0onal laboratories (consult NRC guidelines).
2. Expedite development of the Space Station Safety Organization and utilize
existing NASA safety organizations as required. (Flow chart the different center
responsibilities)
3. Develop accident scenarios, such as for "in-cabin spills', and assign responsibility
for det,ection and removal (both hardware and procedures development) to
approl_riate organizations.
4. Require aii modules to develop common approaches to the distribution,
handling, containment, and use o t toxic and reactive materials. Safety dictated
designs should immediately be transmitted to JEM and Columbus developers.
5. Improve communications across the board: NASA centers, International
partners, contractors, users, industry, flight operations, safety organizations, etc
6. Schedule more user designer operator workshops to communicate safety related
design requirements.
STATIONSUISYSTEMDESIGN
7. Utilize more ground based laboratory saf_.ty features.
-j
8. Reevaluate the total number of ECLSSstations for trace gas monitoring.
9. Conduct a separate review of the PMMS in the following areas: waste storage
systems, commonality with JEM and Columbus, 30 year flexibility, waste limitatmns
as they relate to user requirements, introduction of wastes te the system, and
quantity of water required for operations.
IU. Evaluate potential locations and design requirements for a decontamination
' center in leiu of an "emergency shower'.
11. Reevaluate isolation of the ECLSSavionics air loop from experiments.
12. Review ECLSS,FMS, and PMMS designs with respect to human factors:
maintenance and repair, caution and warning, and emergency procedures.
13. Expedite the definition of Space Station SMAC levels.
1-12
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14. Examinethe benefits and limitations for decentralization of hazardous
l materials handling.
15. Determine if design verification for certain fluid handling systemsisrequired
aboard SpaceShutlle flights prior to SpaceStation implementation.
q
16. Optimize air flows within the modules and the gloveboxes for safer operations.
i-
_t EXPERIMENTDESIGN
. 17. Determine the statusof potential contamination due to external venting of
experiment waste gasesby all module elements. This information must be acquired
immediately sothat design processesfor the FMSand experiments can continue.
(The External EnvironmentsWorking Group may be performing this a_,_essment)
18. Generate a SpaceStation User'smanual and an experiment design data base
:_ which discussesdesign requirements asthey relate to safety.
19. Re-examinecrew operations of e_periments both from a safety point of view
and for optimizing scientificreturn. Optimize the automation/crew operation mix.
20. Reevaluate the glovebox design and user requirements (utilize previous flight
experiencewith tht.=ES_glovebox flown on STS-61A)
INTERNALCONTAMINATION DETECTION AND CONTROL
_ 21. Improve communicationswith both industry and the military for detection,
i removal, and control of toxic and reactive r_laterials.
s
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2. WELCOME t
Edgar R. Pevey and Kenneth R. Taylor
Edgar R. Pevey*
Good morning ladies and gentlemen. On behalf of Teledyne Brown Engineering,
NASA Headquarters, Marshall Space Flight Center, and the MMPF Study Team --
welcome to Huntsville, Alabama, the Huntsville Hilton, and, in particular, to our
workshop "Space Station Toxic and Reactive Materials Handling". I am Ed Pevey,
Manager, Eagineering Studies, Advanced Programs Department, Space Programs Division
at Teledyne Brown.
Prior to the start of the workshop, I wish to recognize some of our key players and
those team members responsible for pulling together the participants in this workshop.
First, from Marshall Space Flight Center, our cqstomer Mr. Ken Taylor, Chief,
Materials Processing in Space Group; a member of Ken's group and the Contracting
Officer's Representative for the MMPF Study - Mr. George McCanless. This workshop is
being funded by Codes E, R, and S and to them we are srateful for this opportunity.
Next, from Teledyne Brown Engineering, our Vice President of Space Programs
Division - Dr. Owen Garriott. The Manager of Advanced Programs - Mr. Anthony
Sharpe. My workshop team: The workshop coordinator - Mr. Paul Galloway and
administrative assistants Ms. Becky Dew and Ms. Teresa Strother.
We are indeed pleased to recognize and welcome several former astronauts/mission
specialists Dr. Bill Pegue, a former Skylab astronaut, and Dr. Bonnie Dunbar, a mission
specialist on the Spacelab D1 mission.
Next, I wish to recognize our Session and Panel Chairpersons. i
Session 1 - Mr. Charles Baugher, NASA/MSFC 1
Session 2 - Ms. Judith Robey, NASA HQ Code S i!
Session 3 - Mr. Richard Tyson, NASA HQ Code R
i
Panel Chairperson - Dr. Bonnie Dunbar, NASA/JSC t
Panel Members - Dr. Martin Coleman, NASA/JSC
Mr. Kenny Mitchell, NASA/MSFC.
!
i
*Manager,MicrogravityMaterialsProcessingFacility(MMPF)Project,TeledyneBrownEngineering i
|
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sAgain, to all of you -- both participants and attendees - a ver_ warm Alabama
welcome.
At this time, I present Mr. Ken Taylor for his opening comments.
Mr. Taylor has over 26 years of experience as a Project Engineer, systems engineer,
and Program Manager. Mr. Taylor is chief, Materials Processing in Space Group within
the Advanced Systems Office of the Program Development Directorate at NASA's George
C. Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, AL. The Materials Processing in Space
Group is the focal point for pianning and managing activities in the new field of materials
processing in space.
Mr. Taylor is currently a member of the AIAA _'echnical Committee for Space
Processing. He is a graduate of Mississippi State University with a degree in mechanical
engineering.
Please welcome Mr. Ken Taylor.
Prior to our fu,'stspeaker I have a fe_/ administrative announcements.
• "l'heregistration desk will be maintained just outside this room. There to assist
you with telephone messages, etc. are Becky and Teresa.
• Dinner tickets are on sale - encourage you to invite your spouse.
• We have microphones in the audience - if you have a question please step to the
; microphone, state your name, and then ask your question or provide comments.
If we run out of time for questions, feel free to question the speakers off-line or
bring your question up during the panel discussions.
• Our daily schedules are fight - please observe the start time and be seated on time.
Now, I present Mr. Anthony Sharpe who will provide the oudine of the Workshop
Program.
Mr. Sharpe has over 25 yeas of combined aerospace and space experience as
Manager and Project Manager of various systems engineering and Space Station definition
studies. Prior to coming to Teledyne Brown Engineering he was with SPAR Aerospace
Limited in Canada where he was a Manager in the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System
Division. With Teledyne B;'ownEngineering, he is Manager of the Advanced Programs
Department, Space Programs Division. He received his Bachelor of Science degree from
, the University of Leeds, England. Please welcome Mr. Tony Sharpe.
l
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Kenneth R. Taylor • i
From a payload point of view, the advent of Space Station off-_rsus tremendou_
increases in the capability to operate in space.
• Aboutanorderofmagnitudeincreaseinpower
• Over 5 times the time compared ;o 10 shuttle flights per year
• Significant increases in volume
• • Pe,"hapsanorderofmagnitudeincreaseinmassofon-orbitpayloadequipment
Inspacejustasonca.,'th,theamountofR&D thatcanbcdoneistoa largedegree
dependentuponthetimeavailabletodowork,thepoweravailable,andthevolumeend
massoftheequipmentavailable.So,theSpaceStationffersussomegreatopportunities
toexpandR&D inspace.Moreover,thecostofspaceR&D, whichparticularlyimportant
tocommerci,dusers,isdirectlyaffectedbythevolumeofpayloadactivity.Thefixedcost
oflaunchandoperationscanbedilutedbyincreasingpayloadactivityoyieldlowercost
perexperimentrun.
Therefore,we believewe nccdtoprepareourselvestocapitalizeuponthese
opportunitiesby ensuringthatwe know how toopclateR&D payloadson theSpace
Station.
Essentiallywe intendtocomparewhatisrequiredwithwhatisavailableinorderto
determinewhatweneedtodotocaptalizconSpaceStationtothefullest.
Fortunately,we havealotofbackgroundavailabletous.
• Thereisourpastexperienceonskylabandwe havepeoplethatworkedonboard
thatvehicie and on the project.
• We have similar expertrisefrom the Spacelab Module Project.
I
• We havedesigners,developers,andhwestigatorsnthekeyitemsofcurrentand '_!
future payloads that will be adapted to or designed for the Space Station.
!
• We have expertise on the measurement, monitoring, and control of materials.
• And ofcourse,we havekeySpaceStationparticipants, i
, O1._rgoalisaninterchangebetweenyouthatwillbegintodevelopthedesignand '
operational guidelines that enable us to fully capitalize upon space to advance material
science and technology, in particu'.,a',and space re,c,a.rchand development in general. You
#
•Chief, Materials Processing in Space Group, NASA/MSFC
#
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-_'ethe key to obtaining this goal. Y_u h:: ., -_._invited not only for your expertise, but
c_¢ of your dedication and can-dor _, - -_--'_to yourwork.
Therefor,,-, we appreciate ":,_,J_L .,,._dhope that each of you benefit from this
worgsho_ :_sr;l_:Chas the w(_r!csh, • ' .,:fit from you.
p
1
1
I
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3. INTRODUCTION
OUTLINE OF WORKSHOP PROGRAM
Anthony Sharpe*
The advent of the Space Station will mark the beginning of a new and enormously
exciting era of space exverimentation and operations for NASA and this nation. For the
f'wsttime since the Skylab days, people w,il live and work for extended periods of time in a
permanent orbiting space facility. Their home will be the habitat rr",dule, in which they will
eat, sleep, exercise and simply relax. Their wonq31acewill be the laboratory modules, in
which they will conduct a wide variety of materi_ls ._cocess:.ng and life science
experime.,,.ts, timeshared witi. many other operations (ranging from routine maintenance
and repah-,to monitoring and controlling external attache[ payloads). In the development of
these modules the highest possible priority will be given to establishing provisions that will
ensure crew comfort and safety at all times. This : _I1be particularly challenging in the case
of the laboratory modules, since certain activities wltlainthese modules (examples of which
are: experiment setup, sample change'_ut, sample analysis, and experiment hardware
cleanup) may require crev, interactions with hazardous materials.
NASA Headquarters and the Marshall Space Flight Center recognize that the need to
accommodate and handle the wide variety of materials anticipated within the labcratory
modules gives rise to major crew safety issues that must be resolved early in the Space
Station program. Appreciating that, when complex issues have to be addressed, many
heads axe better than one (especially if they belong to experts!), NASA Headquar:,ers
(Codes E, R and S) - up,der the auspices of the "Space Station Environmental oreenng
Group," have given Teledyne Brown Engineerin,,, the task of organizing this workshop
with the theme: "Space Station Toxic and Rea,:tiveMaterials Handling. i
We would like to extend a very warm welcome to all of you who have accepted our i
invitation to attend this workshop. Our aim, of course, is to "pick your brair.s"; but we _
also hope that these three days at Huntsville Hilton will prove useful and rewarding to you J
in youc own work.
The workshop consists of three one-day sessi9_s, organized in a logical sequen'ce,
b,_ginning with a consolidation of hazardou., materials handling requirements for Space 1
Station, in Se3sion 1; continuing with a review of current Space Station concepts (both -_
hardware and operational) for handling hazardous mater'als, in Session 2; and concl._ding 1
*Manager, Advanced Programs Department, Teledyne Brown Engineering
L
i
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with a review of existing a.jd advanced systems for detecting and controlling chemical i
;
contaminants, in Ses:;on 3.
Specifically, in Session 1, we will review our past experience in handl_r,ghazardous
materials in space, and will include presentations on previous Skylab and Spacelab
missions. Our review of present activities will benefit from ?resentations (,n upcoming
Spacelabmissionsandthecurrentworkbeingperformedby theSoviets.The future
requirementsformaterialsprocessingontheSpaceStationwillbereflectedinpresentations
on thesixCodeEN experimentfacilities.Also,a presentationon lifesciencepayload
. requirementswill identifythe uniquerequir..mentsof th'; life _ci'.:ncecommunity.
In the first half of Session 2, we will have at. overv;_w of the Space Station, and
._ thosesubsystemsthatarededicatedtotke rolec,fhandlinghazardousmaterialssafely.
Two majorSpaceStationsubsystemsthat'willbediscussedaretheEnvironmentalControl
andLifeSupportSubsystemandtheFluidManagementSubsystem.Alsodiscussediathe
Session2 willbethecapabilitiesandinterfacesoftheProcessMaterialsManagement
Subsystem,whichistheprimarysubsystemoftheUnitedStatesLaboratorychargedwith
thetaskofhandlinganddisposingofhazardousmaterials.Inaddition,theSpaceetation's
logisticscapabilitiesw llbeaddressed.
The secondhalfofSession2 willcometogripswiththesubjectofmannedsystems
and crewsafety,whichistheprimarypurposeoftheworkshop.NASA shouldbe
commendedforaddressingthecrewsafetyissuearlyi'_"heSpaceStationprogramwhile
modificationstothehardwareandoperationalconceptscanbeincorporatedwithlittlecost
and schedule impact.
Our thirdand finatsessionwilladdressinternalcontaminationdetectionand
contaminationcontrol.We willhavepresentationshighlightingexistingcontamination
controlaevices,suchas g]oveboxes,and we willexamineadvancedtechnology i
developments and new processes for their potential application to the Space Station i
program. Varic_ustechnical approaches to chemical contamination detection will be
discussed in this session. Rapid and reliable chemical contaminat;,ondetection will be one [
of the greatest technical challenges of the Space Station program !
Many of the speakers in the third session are not involv_l in the Space Station
program, but have extremely relevant knowledge and experience to share v4th us. We do
appreciate their willingness to spend this time with us and we are gra,'efu! tor their technical 4
contributions to this workshop. .,
Following each of the three sessions, there will be panel discussions, in which the
subjects broughtout durins the sessions will be discussed by the panel members. We hope
I
forstrongaudienceparticipationinthesepaneldiscussions.
3-2 :
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This workshop is intended to address Space Station laboratorymodule internal !
i
!contamination issues and to answer some key associated questions. It is quite likely, i
however, that we will raise as many new questions as we answer! | :_
On Thursday, there will be a summary of the entire workshop, with an outline of the I
major findings, conclusions, recommendations, and remaining concerns _at surfaced _.
during the presentations and discussiov_ of the previous two days. Again, we hope for _
lively discussions on the part of the attendees and participants of the workshop.
A banquet is planned for tonight. We will have me great pleasure of an after-dinner
speech by a former Skylab and Shuttle Astronaut, Dr. Owen Garriott, who is now Vice
President of the Space Programs Division of Teledyne Brown Engineering.
It is our sincere wish that the outcome of this workshop will, in terms of value, be )
greater than the sum of its par.s, providing a much-enriched knowledge base fr¢,m which
we can all work.
I would like to extend my own very best wishes to all of you for an enjoyable and
profitable time in Huntsville, where the sky is most definitely not the limit!
It is now my pleasure to introduce the Session 1 Chairman, Mr. Charles R. Baugher.
w
t
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!
i SUMMARY AND KEY ISSUES IDENTIFICATION
-2
2.
_. by
Session 1 Chairman: Charles R. Baugher
NASA - MSFC
i
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SESSION 1
l
t
(
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Session 1 consisted of an overview of the United State's past, present, and future :"
requirements for handling hazardous materials in space. The presentations or past ,
experience included America's first Space Station, or "Skylab", and two Spacelab missions j
(D-1 and SL-3). Present space activities that were highlighted in the workshop were the
upcoming Spacelab J and 3pacelab USML-1 missions. Also, an overview of the Soviet
MPS activities in space was provided as a basis for comparison of the planned U.S. MPS
activities for the Space Station Freedom. The future requirements for handling hazardous
materials in space were covered in presentation on the six code EN or MSAD Space Station
faciliti¢,, which are the current MPS experiment facilities. In addition, the hazardous
materials and operations associated with non-human life science payloads were detailed in
' an informative presentation by a representative of the life science community.
" One former and one current astronaut, Dr. William Pogue and Dr. Bonnie Dunbar,
participated m the workshop and made presentations concerning lessons learned on Skylab
and $paceiao. The information provided by these astronauts has direct application to the
: Space Station program. For the reason, it is ;mportant to provide in detail the key issues
discussed by these representatives of the astronaut community.
Former astronaut Dr. William Pogue, who flew on the last Skylab mission recounted
several experiences from his flight and made several points. First, was his concern for the
potential of off-gassing from materials. Skylab had over-heated and several hardware
items released toxic fumes as a result. Slcylab's air was changed out twice before the crew
entered it to eliminate most of these gases. Second, was his concern with leakage. The !
!
Skylah cooling system used g!yco[, and this syste,n developed a leak. Dr. Pogue pointed ,.
out that the Skylab cooling system was designed to be a leak-proof system. Inadequate i
eqmpment was providedforthe cleanup and the leakingmaterialspreadsomuch that glycol
was detected in d:.eair filters. Metabolic waste and other m_terials were a frequent source
of spills, (for example, sweat thrown from the exercising crew members). Inadequate !
procedures existed for clean-up. Future missions should provide for these activities. Even _
with the best designs, accidents will happen. Procedures and tools should be developed to
accc,mmodate these contingencies. Thirdly, Pot;_e was concerned with particulates and
their collection and removal. Air filters became packed with contaminants which were very
difficult to remove. The vacuum system provided for removing such material was
inadequate. A good vacuum system on future missions is highly recommended. Filters i
should also be large and be placed in locations with easy access, so they van be readily
7
t
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cleaned. Fourth,Skylab suffered from many false alarms. This can lead to desensitization
of the crew. Any f'u'¢deletion or leak detection system should be designed to reduce false
alarms. Fifth, fire andleak detection systems should reveal location of problem and hand-
held units should be provided for furtherassistance. Skylab did not have this capability
andit took an unncces:_.xi!ylong time to research false alarms. Plus, in a real emergenc?
the soonera locationis known the betterme potenfi_ forremedialaction. Sixth, any future
gas detection system should be capableof detectingall conmminm+_. $kylab had ,,u ieak
detection system. Seventh, a tool was usec'on Skylab which P.ada numbering system
associated with the mechanism. These numberswere glued on andeventually c._meoff.
Futurelabeling systems should not be prone to this problem. Eighth, some combustion
tests haveindicatedthat entrainedairin a fire exunguisbersexhaustmay actuallyfeed a f'u'c.
More research needs to be done in th;s _.r_.a.Ninth, Skylab tests showed that porous
materials bum readily in a low-g envh'onment. Lastly, Pogue was concerned by reliance
on containment. On Skylab a camera was opened and it was full of broken glass. This
glass was supposed to be contained within the camera. The main point is don't depend
upon containment. Procedures and tools should be developed to overcom_ accidental
+ material release.
Dr. Bonnie Dunbar gave an informative presentation on the Spacelab D1 mission.
'- Her presentation was primarily an overview of the mission. She pointed out that a large
: reason for the missions success was because of extensive preflight training. She also
l emphasized the importance of crew members having extensive knowledge of the
experiments and materials they are expected to handle. One minor ._int brought out wasl
_" th_: the airflow fromSpacelab is into the Shuttle middeckand flight deck area. Therefore,
I debris from Spacelab tended to collect in those areas. It was later pointed out that this
would not be a desirable air flow pattern in the case of a hazardous material. One would
want the air flow to be away from the crew. In discussing material science experiments,
Bonnie pointed out that many materials are toxic only at high tempe,'atures. One sample
failed in the gradient heating furnaceon this mission. However, a rewievaJprocedure had
been practiced on the ground, this was successfully used on-orbit. The sample that failed
was a late mission add-on, which had its composition changed from the sample it replaced.
However, the crew was not informed of this change and used an incorrect thermal profile.
This anomaly points up the need for tight control between any changes that the
• experimenterm_es to his facility or materials and the need for the crew to be completely
familiar with those changes and their consequences. A nmjor failure occurred on D-1,
silicone oil leaked from a facility and the oil spreadover the rack surfacesand contaminated
4-3
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otheradjacentSpacelabequipment.This incidentoccurredbecausesiliconeoilwill
daoroughlywetalmostanysurfaceitcomes incontactwith.
No proceduresor toolshad bccn providedforclean-up.Futuremissionshave to
considerthesecvcntualitites.Dunbarencouragedrackdeveloperstoprovidetheirown
uniquetoolsforequipmentrepairandoperation.Dunbarconcludedby saying:l)Safetyis
thekeytoasuccessfulmission,2)aninternationalpo icyforsafetyandthesecxpcr:.mcnts
isrequired,3)thefullsafetyburdenshouldbcsharedbetweenSS systemsandexperiment
facilities,and4)reLiablechemicalcontaminationdetectionu itsarcneedednow. Shealso
recommended a new NRC safetydocument.She alsohadone comment on automation.
You can'tautomatewhatyoudon'tgnow,thecrewwillberequkredtomake mochfications
tohardwareandprocedures.
As tberesultofDunbar's-)resentationseveralcommentsweremade. One was thatin
considering triple containment one needed to consider each material on an individual basis.
Some materials are safer than others. A disc ::sio_, of fault tolerance as opposed to triple
containment then arose. Another point raised was that the SS does not allow ,Sreeventing,
wl_ich the Spacelab does. What operational impacts will this have on the users? Dunbar
' mentioned here that the glovcbox on D-1 worked well except that it had only one glove
4 size, which was too large for her after it was stretched out. Dr. Dunbar recommended
!
,- various glove sizes for the gloveboxes that will be flown on Space Station.
It/,X_KS.5.U./
1. There is a strong conflict between the payload desire to vent waste and the restrictions
on external contamination. Sixty-six percent of the existing MPS payloads ,'equire
venting. The venting requirements do not define a venting allocation for each Space
Station Module. All sides appear to be unaware of the rationale on the part of others, ,:
and little information is being exchanged. This issue calls for coordination by Level
II since it involves many Codes and Work packages. ,_q
2. Off-gassing of equipment must be considered a source of potential noxious material, i
Strict controls should be imposed to reduce or eliminate this hazard, i
3. Adequate equipment for lab cleaning must be provided. Filters and other hardware to j
, be cleaned must be easily accessible and must be designed with cleaning requirements
in mind.
-- 4. Little consideration was given to ground operations with these hazardous materials.
Who is responsible for these areas and what plans have they made for these i_
operations? More attention needs to be given to this area. 1
5. The potential for various levels of waste treatment exists: at the rack level, at the !,
module level, and for the entire SS. The specifics of these levels of processing need i
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to be defined as soon as possible as they will impact user hardware design. Many of
these designs will be entering Phase A/B development v_y soon.
6. It is critical that fire and leak detection systems be designed to locate a leak or fire
source. General alarms are inadequate. Reduction of false alarms is desirable and
hand-held portable units for alarm foUow-up are also desired.
7. The current requirement concerning storage of potentially explosive materials is
misleading as stated. Strict interpretation of the requirement would indicate that
hydrogen gas would have to be stored outside the module.
8. More organized and direct communications are required between Space Station and
User techni_:_l personnel. In many cases the laboratory users are among the most
knowledgeable authorities on handling compounds associated with their experiments
and their expertise should be directly focused in a visible fashion. In addition, lack of
information to design teams tends to lead to "worst case" over design as engineers
attempt to develop systems to accommodate vague generalities. ,.
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